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The earthquake and tsunami that struck Aceh on December 26, 2004 made Aceh 
well known. This is in great contrast with the time just before the catastrophe. Then, 
Aceh was sealed off, the result of the efforts by Jakarta as it continued its nearly thirty- 
year-long armed conflict against the region's insurrectionaries. From May 19, 2003, 
Aceh was closed off from the outside world under a state of "military emergency." 
Foreigners, including aid workers and journalists, were forbidden entry. Although the 
emergency measures were heavily criticized, the "state of emergency" was renewed on 
November 19, 2004 for six months. On May 19, 2004, it was "lowered" to become a 
"civil emergency," which was imposed for six more months. In Aceh, however, no 
difference at all could be perceived. Inhabitants' movements were still limited; force 
was still very often used. And foreigners were still forbidden to enter Aceh except at 
three isolated places: Sabang, Simeuleu, and Singkil.
A couple of days after the catastrophe, the worst of its sort in human history, Aceh 
seemed to have been forcibly opened to the international world. From a place lacking 
the presence of international media, Aceh became a place covered by media from all 
over the world. Suddenly Banda Aceh and the areas along the shore to the west and 
the east were filled by foreign nationals from various groups, of various colors, 
religions, races, and cultures. Banda Aceh became a true international city.
Calang, on Aceh's west coast, now forms part of the regency of Aceh Jaya, a new 
regency, the result of the blossoming of West Aceh, which was itself the result of the 
euphoria stirred up by the autonomy and decentralization Jakarta decreed in the 1990s. 
Calang was totally destroyed by the earthquake and tsunami. It was so completely 
destroyed that the local government moved the regency capital from Calang to Lamno, 
about fifty kilometers away in the direction of Banda Aceh. Practically no buildings 
were left in Calang; the entire infrastructure was leveled to the ground. (At the latest 
report, the transfer of the capital of Aceh Jaya from Calang to Lamno had been
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postponed because the government and people from the area were afraid they would 
not get enough assistance if visitors representing aid organizations only saw Lamno, 
which received less than half the damage of Calang.)
At the very least, from the day the wave hit to the time when I was last there on 
January 28, everything in Calang, including humanitarian work, had to begin from 
zero. The roads to Calang from every direction are destroyed. One can get into Calang 
only by air or sea. Water, electricity, food, and all necessities have to be brought in or 
scavenged. Everyone sleeps in tents, including those government officials who were 
saved. There are approximately four thousand internally displaced persons (IDP) who 
live in tents or in huts they built themselves. Before the tsunami, Calang had about 
seven thousand residents. Calang at this point is no more than a big camp of people 
living in temporary quarters with temporary implements scraped together on the spot.
The marines, the elite troops of the Indonesian navy, claim that it was they who 
first opened Calang and the west coast, ending the region's isolation, after the tsunami. 
According to the inhabitants of Calang, they only got help four or five days after the 
tsunami struck. Some of them survived with whatever they found in the jungle and 
with the remains of food from family members living in the interior who were safe.
When I got to Calang via a helicopter owned by an international NGO, I saw right 
away that the marines were the "owners" of Calang and a large portion of the west 
coast. (At latest report, the marines' position has been taken over by Brimob [Mobile 
Brigade].) Everyone who arrives by helicopter or boat has to report to the marine 
commander. The marines have the most tents on the plain that contains the remains of 
Calang. At the time there were only two UN programs represented, along with 
nineteen international and two national NGOs, each with a staff of only two or three 
persons. The rest were marines and IDP in tents and huts they had constructed 
themselves. The IDPs live in the hilly region around Calang.
The marines put up tents for a school and a field-hospital. The marines readied a 
tent for orphans. The marines controlled the logistics and the heavy equipment that 
entered and left Calang. The marines run the game in Calang!
Actually, there is nothing wrong when humanitarian aid is provided by marines 
and the Indonesian armed forces, including the police and Brimob, the paramilitary 
police unit. The armed forces everywhere, indeed, are usually the backbone of the 
attempts at restoration after a catastrophe. In such a dire situation, following the 
enormous catastrophe that knocked out Aceh and other countries in South and 
Southeast Asia, any concerns about accepting assistance from the military should be 
minimal. But the social and political history of security in Aceh changes everything. 
Conflict and war still go on in Aceh. The civil emergency has not yet been lifted, and 
the ceasefire between the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National 
Army) and GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement) is only ad hoc and 
situational.
At the very least, it is the usual international practice that the sides who are 
involved in armed conflict must not take part in the work of humanitarian aid. The 
vested interests padding them, as they go about arms in hand, make it very easy for 
them to misuse that aid.
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But, you say, there is no one else who could have reopened the area and brought 
effective aide to Calang except the marines. They prepared electricity, hospitals, 
sources of water, and even became teachers in emergency schools. Of course, with 
arms in hand everywhere and wherever they go and stay. I saw myself how these 
honorable marines taught in the emergency elementary-junior-senior-high school with 
M-16s strapped across their backs.
The situation is indeed difficult. Amateur humanitarian work certainly could not 
accomplish much in Calang. It took those who were trained and professional. Marines 
of course were well trained to control the coasts as well as areas located quite a 
distance inshore in this difficult situation.
Why are the marines stationed on the west coast? Of course, one factor is that 
Safzen Noerdin, currently the commandant of the Indonesian Naval Armed Forces 
Marines, is from Kriieng Sabee, eight kilometers south of Calang. Just at the right time 
the marines at Calang were commanded directly by a one-star general! Equipped even 
with amphibious landing vehicles and enormous-wheeled trucks and other heavy 
equipment. The marines at Calang are heroes.
Other factors concern prestige, influence, and image. Not just for the marines but 
for all the troops of the TNI and for the Indonesian government. The pictures that 
appeared repeatedly on TV showing US troops dropping food that was immediately 
grabbed up by desperate crowds on Aceh's west coast of course challenged the value, 
the capabilities, of the TNI and the Indonesian nation itself. After reports that US 
troops were the first to end the isolation of Aceh's west coast, it was as though the 
Indonesian marines wanted to make sure that their influence would be taken into 
account. And what could be more effective in consolidating their influence and 
repairing their image than evidence that they had helped solve logistical crises and 
prepared necessities?
For the people of Calang and other areas of the west coast, it did not matter who 
donated the aid, it seems. So long as what they needed was supplied, they took it 
willingly. But the source of aid nevertheless becomes an issue when members of an 
effective professional organization, such as the marines, are present in an area of 
armed conflict.
Almost all the inhabitants of Calang who became refugees stated that they were 
afraid to get too close to the marines. They received aid, but it all came via the marines. 
They accused marines of piling up aid supplies in warehouses and taking for 
themselves the choicest clothes, tools, and food—only then was the rest passed on to 
the people. There were also reports that at Panga, about eight kilometers south of 
Calang, supplies for the inhabitants were always rationed out by the marines because 
they were afraid that GAM guerrillas would benefit from the donations.
The IDPs from Calang also said that they were free to receive humanitarian aid 
only if foreign troops were present. I myself saw how refugees swarmed down from 
the hills to the Calang coast to get the aid they needed when the US Navy unloaded it 
from the USS McHenry in hovercrafts. They were busy choosing clothes, food, and 
drink, which they were free to take as they liked. Indeed, the US troops helped them 
open the big cartons and told them to help themselves to whatever they wanted. But as
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soon as the foreign troops left, the IDPs immediately went back to their camps. They 
said, 'The marines don't let us take things [supplies] ourselves."
For the people of the coast, the American troops are heroes. And the marines ... ? 
Well, they are heroes too, but viewed with a certain reserve. The heroes from America 
are respected; the heroes from their own country are feared, could we say?
